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NOTES
Defense Witness Immunity
By Michael A Boone*
Introduction
One of the most fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights is
that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."' It is reassuring to know that the United
States Constitution so clearly sides with an individual against govern-
mental coercion. The image of one person standing resolutely against
the vast powers of government appeals to our sense of fairness and per-
sonal dignity. It is disconcerting, however, that this same protection
can be an insurmountable barrier to a fair trial. The Fifth Amendment
protection loses its initial appeal when one person's life or liberty will
be lost if access to another person's knowledge is denied.
In the context of criminal justice, a difficult question arises: How
does the Constitution or our sense of fairness and personal dignity bal-
ance a witness's right to withhold evidence which might implicate him
in a crime against the accused's right to prove his innocence by that
evidence?
In order to gain the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial, a
criminal defendant must usually exercise his Sixth Amendment com-
pulsory process right2 and have the court issue a subpoena. The de-
fendant's resort to court process, reinforced by the court's contempt
power, constitutes state action which triggers the subpoenaed witness's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 3 The Constitu-
* B.A., 1973, Pepperdine University, Los Angeles; member, third year class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment protection has been incorporated
into Fourteenth Amendment due process and now applies equally against state government
action. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 interpretedin Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
Regarding the relative importance of this protection, Justice Brennan has recognized
that because the American criminal justice system is accusatorial rather than inquisitorial,
"the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay." 378 U.S. at 7.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to have compul-
sory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right
was made binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
3. "That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to
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tion thus mechanically affords protection against state action, irrespec-
tive of whose interests, governmental or individual, underlie its use.
One way to accommodate the witness's and defendant's adverse
interests would be to grant the witness immunity from prosecution in
exchange for his testimony. The Constitution permits displacing the
witness's privilege by granting him immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion coextensive in scope with the privilege's protection.4 In practical
terms, however, witness immunity is not available to the defendant.
While statutes in all jurisdictions5 vest a prosecutor with discre-
tionary authority to seek witness immunity as a means of furthering the
public interest in prosecuting criminals, a criminal defendant, by con-
trast, ordinarily has no express statutory authority and must seek de-
fense witness immunity indirectly through the prosecution.6 The court
usually lacks express authority to invoke independently the statute and
may confer immunity only upon the prosecution's request.7 The prose-
cution, not surprisingly, seldom finds the public interest served by de-
fense witness immunity.' Such requests by the defendant are routinely
denied, and the court, usually lacking express authority to intervene,9
often must defer to the prosecutor's discretion.' 0
During the 1960's and 1970's, courts and commentators searched
for a constitutionally based right to defense witness immunity. Statu-
tory immunity had proved inadequate, and theorists hoped to discover
the answer lying dormant in the Constitution.'2 Each of the variety of
be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court." Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). Even when the witness appears voluntarily, the state power of
testimonial inquiry is "impliedly invoked by the very situation without subpoena." 8 3.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2282, at 514-15 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
4. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 450 (1972); notes 31 & 34 infra.
5. For a compilation of immunity statutes in force in the United States, United States
protectorates, England and Canada, see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2281, at 495 n.1l.
6. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
8. For a discussion of this problem in the context of the federal general immunity
statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976), see Mykkeltvedt, United Stater r Alessio-Due Process
of Law and Federal Grants of Witness Immunityfor Defense Witnesses, 31 MERCER L. REv.
689, 692-93 (1980).
9. See notes 86-107 and accompanying text infra.
10. See note 48 infra.
11. See, e.g., Weston, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unpied Theory of Evi-
dencefor Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978); Note, Right of the Criminal Defend-
ant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 953 (1967); Note, A Re-
examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Usefor Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
74 (1972). See also materials cited in note 133 infra.
12. There are three manifest advantages of constitutionally mandated immunity over
statutory immunity. First, a right arising under the Federal Constitution can be recognized
immediately without relying on cumbersome legislative processes. Second, the right can be
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theories propounded, however, posed difficulties. Specific trial guaran-
tees such as confrontation 3 and compulsory process14 had crystallized
into narrow case law tests which, if expanded to encompass defense
witness immunity, might leave the protections overly broad in their pri-
mary contexts. Equal protection 15 yielded only a deferential standard
of review and afforded only minimal protection. 6 Finally, concepts of
general due process,' 7 including the right to a fair trial 8 and the right
to present a defense,' 9 seemed to defy workable standards, requiring
instead case-by-case determination.2" Lacking direct guidance by the
Supreme Court and concerned about separation of powers problems, 2'
lower courts were slow to recognize constitutionally based immunity.
The 1980's have seen renewed interest in statutorily and constitu-
tionally based immunity. The 1980 Third Circuit decision in Virgin Is-
lands v. Smith22 has been particularly controversial in its approach to
applied uniformly from one jurisdiction to another. Federal courts, rather than local legisla-
tors, would articulate minimum standards. Finally, no state could derogate from those fed-
erally established minimums.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (made binding on the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)).
14. See note 2 supra.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. There are two equal protection arguments in the context of statutory immunity.
One challenges disparate treatment of prosecution and defense witnesses, and the other chal-
lenges the prosecutor's selection of one co-defendant over another as the recipient of immu-
nity. See note 86 infra.
17. By announced standards of general due process, defense witness immunity is man-
dated in situations where it is deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or "fundamental to the American scheme of justice,"
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). From a negative perspective, due process is
violated in situations where a denial of immunity "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
18. "The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). The right is encompassed within the
broad parameters of due process and is implicit in the Sixth Amendment's specific criminal
trial guarantees and in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
19. "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 294 (1973). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
20. Justice Frankfurter staunchly defended the "vague contours" of due process in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168-73 (1952). But see Justice Black's protest against
adjudicating important constitutional rights by such "nebulous standards." Id at 174-77
(concurring opinion).
21. The prosecution's traditionally exclusive authority to seek statutory immunity un-
fortunately has led many courts to believe that all immunity, whether statutorily or constitu-
tionally based, is exclusively an executive or legislative prerogative. See notes 55-85 & 174-
84 and accompanying text infra. Under that misconception, any court ordered immunity
granted without statutory authority is an unconstitutional judicial intrusion into the exclu-
sive realm of the executive or legislative branches. See Note, Sefparation of Po wers and De-
fense Witness Immunity, 66 GEo. L.J. 51 (1977).
22. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The court in Smith recognizes two independent situa-
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defense witness immunity.
This note considers defense witness immunity first by examining
the operation and effect of immunity statutes 3 and their use as a poten-
tial source of defense witness immunity, then by exploring the use of
immunity as a remedy for constitutional wrongs, discussing the source
of constitutional protection and the appropriate manner of affording
relief. Next, the source of the government's immunity power will be
analyzed. The note concludes by suggesting specific administrative,
legislative and judicial reform measures.
I. Statutory Immunity
A. Operation, Scope and Effect
An immunity statute is a legislative delegation of the government's
power to indemnify2 n a witness against criminal prosecution and oper-
ates as a substitute for the witness's Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. 25 Although not expressly set out in the
Constitution, the government's immunity power has "historical roots
deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence."26 Immunity statutes, cur-
rently in force in all state and federal jurisdictions,2 7 have "become part
of our constitutional fabric."'2 8 This traditional acceptance of immu-
nity29 reflects the pragmatic realization that many crimes would be im-
tions in which the Constitution demands defense witness immunity. One, a due process
violation resulting from prosecutorial misconduct, requires that the government either grant
immunity on retrial or suffer an acquittal. The other, wherein the prosecution's refusal to
grant immunity denies the defendant an effective defense, establishes a court's inherent au-
thority to confer judicially fashioned immunity. The latter situation is particularly contro-
versial since it counters the long-settled principle that the power to grant immunity is
exclusively executive or legislative. In Smith, the court not only recognized two constitu-
tional bases of relief but also found both remedies available in one case. Given the histori-
cal weight against judicially fashioned immunity and the availability of an alternate
holding, it is surprising that the court chose even to discuss, much less to create, such a novel
remedy. For further discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 109-91 infra.
23. This note will use important cases to illustrate common concepts and judicial atti-
tudes without attempting to analyze the current position of every state and federal jurisdic-
tion. This area of law is in transition, making any comprehensive survey effort futile.
Moreover, many jurisdictions have yet to reexamine their respective case law in the light of
recent developments.
24. In England, the term "indemnity" is used to describe immunity. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 n.13 (1972).
25. Immunity statutes "seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the
privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify." Id at
446.
26. Id at 445.
27. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 495 n. 11.
28. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
29. See generalo Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,443-47 (1972) (capsule history
of immunity statutes in both England and the United States).
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possible to uncover and prosecute without a means of supplanting the
witness's privilege."
Immunity supplants a witness's privilege by removing the basis for
invoking it. The Fifth Amendment protects a witness against giving
testimony that is both compelled and self-incriminating.3 It does not
protect against voluntary self-incrimination nor against compelled, but
not self-incriminating testimony. Since the purpose and effect of im-
munity are to compel testimony,32 such compulsion is permissible only
when the testimony obtained will not be self-incriminating. Testimony
is incriminating when it leads to "the infliction of 'penalties. . . affixed
to the criminal acts.' "v3 Immunity removes the threat of incrimination
by guaranteeing that none of the testimony given under the immunity
grant will be used against the witness in any future criminal
prosecution.
The Fifth Amendment right is preserved if the scope of immunity
conferred leaves the witness and the state in "substantially the same
position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a
... grant of immunity."34 Until the early seventies, the Court had
30. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, recognized that certain offenses "are of such
a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in
the crime." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). This is especially true with
respect to treason, political bribery, consumer fraud, gambling, racketeering and extortion.
Id at 446-47 nn.14 & 15.
3 1. Note the overlap of the Fifth Amendment witness privilege and the Sixth Amend-
ment protection against coerced confessions where compelled self-incriminating testimony
constitutes a confession. In such circumstances, testimony obtained pursuant to an immu-
nity grant may be "compelled" in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment senses. "A coerced
confession is as revealing. . . as testimony given in exchange for immunity and indeed is
excluded in part because it is compelled incrimination in violation of the privilege." Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964) (emphasis added) (White, J., concurring).
The Sixth Amendment may also come into play when a witness foregoes the Fifth
Amendment privilege reasonably expecting, but not actually receiving, immunity. "A con-
fession induced by a promise of immunity is involuntary." 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL Evi-
DENCE § 681 (13th ed. 1973).
32. Testimony obtained by immunizing a witness over his claim of privilege is certainly
"compelled" in the Fifth Amendment sense. The prototype for modem immunity statutes,
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976), provides that once a compulsion order issues, "the witness may
not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination"
and that testimony which would otherwise be immune may nonetheless be used against the
witness "in a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwisefailing to comply
with the order." Id at § 6002 (emphasis added).
33. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956), quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). It is important to keep this narrow definition of self-incrim-
ination in mind since "there is nothing inherently wrong with the process of compulsory
incriminatory interrogation; instead, there is merely a need to confine it so that such ques-
tioning [will] not emerge in the subject's own criminal trial." M. BERGER, TAKING THE
FIFTH 49 (1980).
34. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). The Court has stated more
generally that "legislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege. . . unless it is so broad
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held that only transactional immunity could override the privilege;35 in
Kastigar v. United States,36 however, the Court held that the broader
use and derivative use immunity "is coextensive with the privilege and
suffices to supplant it."37
An immunized witness must testify fully and truthfully.38 Once
immunized, he may no longer invoke the Fifth Amendment 9 and may
as to have the same extent in scope and effect." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585
(1892). See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 594 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). Transactional immunity confers blanket immunity over the entire
offense testified to rather than over just the information divulged. Such broad protection has
been likened to amnesty or an executive pardon. 161 U.S. at 601-02.
36. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
37. Id at 462. Kastigar presented the question of whether the newly enacted federal
immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976), conferred immunity coextensive in scope
with the privilege against self-incrimination. Section 6002 provides that after a witness has
been ordered to testify over his claim of privilege "no testimony or other information com-
pelled under the order (or any information directly [use] or indirectly [derivative use] derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case." The statute had been drafted in reliance on the Court's dictum in Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), that full transactional immunity was not necessary to
supplant the privilege and that immunity from the "use of compelled testimony and its
fruits" would be constitutionally sufficient. id at 79.
As expected, the Court in Kasligar held that the protection afforded by the new federal
statute was coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege-at least as construed by the
Court as imposing on the prosecution "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it
proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony." 406 U.S. at 460.
The Court ultimately concluded that transactional immunity "affords the witness con-
siderably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege" and that the new
use and derivative use immunity was sufficient. Id. at 453. But see id at 462-71 (Douglas &
Marshall, JJ., separately dissenting).
The new federal statute "repealed all the previous transactional immunity statutes,"
Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1973), and although many state stat-
utes retain transactional immunity, most statutes enacted since Kastigar have adopted the
less expansive immunity sanctioned in that case. Those new state statutes often are modeled
closely after the federal statute upheld in Kastigar, making that and other federal decisions
directly applicable. See note 2 supra.
38. At common law, every citizen owes the sovereign a duty to testify, and the govern-
ment has the power to compel that testimony. See generally Note, "The Public Has a Claim
to Every Man's Evidence" The Defendants Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30
STAN. L. REv. 1211 (1978). Testimonial privileges are exceptions created by government
and are, in theory, subject to retraction. Our government, however, is bound by the Bill of
Rights and may interfere with its protections only in constitutionally permissible ways. For
discussions of the witness privilege in this context, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 443-44 (1972); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600-06 (1896). See also Doyle v. Hof-
stader, 257 N.Y. 244, 263-65, 177 N.E. 489, 496 (1931) (status of the privilege against self-
incrimination under the English parliamentary system).
39. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976), which provides that the witness "may not refuse
to comply with the [compulsion] order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination."
[Vol. 9:199
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
be adjudged in contempt of court for refusing to answer on that
ground.4° Further, he is not free to give false testimony or to perjure
himself. False statements may be used against the immunized witness
to the extent necessary to prosecute him for perjury.41
B. Immunity for the Prosecution's Use
All immunity statutes applicable to criminal trials authorize the
prosecution to seek witness immunity.42 Since the concept of immunity
grew out of government's need to detect and prove criminal activity,
immunity traditionally has been viewed as a tool of the prosecution.43
Most statutes expressly designate which government official-typically
the district attorney-is authorized to seek immunity for a witness.44
Even where the statute is ambiguous or silent as to who may seek im-
munity, courts most often construe the statute as vesting that authority
40. The imposition of contempt penalties is consistent with the concept of immunity.
Immunity removes the threat of criminal penalties imposed for acts disclosed in the testi-
mony. Contempt penalizes the witness, not for the substance of his testimony or lack
thereof, but for deliberately defying the court's authority. Contempt penalties are also com-
patible with the premise that one may not be penalized for exercising a constitutional right.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). Once
immunity has been granted, a witness's silence is not the valid exercise of a constitutional
right, because the right has been supplanted and is no longer available.
41. See People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 761,431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 429, 409 N.E.2d 897,
904-05 (1980); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
Even though perjury is punished as a criminal act, it is reconcilable with immunity in
two ways. First, immunity can be seen as being granted on the condition that any testimony
given will be true, with false testimony lying outside the umbrella of protection. Under this
view, the false testimony, no matter how incriminating, was never immunized. It could be
used against the witness not only to establish perjury but also in other criminal prosecutions.
Of course, this hardly leaves the witness and the state in "substantially the same position" as
if the witness had been able to assert his privilege. The information would never have been
divulged but for the immunity granted. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. A sec-
ond approach is to view immunity as extending only to testimonial disclosures which link
the witness to crimes independent of the testimony given, not to testimony which is itself the
crime. According to this view, the perjured testimony is and remains immunized for all
purposes except for perjury prosecution. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 511-12.
Wigmore offers another analysis. The argument is that one who falsely exonerates himself
has not "incriminated" himself, and one who falsely incriminates himself was not "com-
pelled" to do so. The second half of the analysis assumes that one is compelled only to give
true testimony. Id at 512.
For an analysis of the problem of prosecuting an immunized witness for perjury when
the fact of his perjury is derived circumstantially from subsequent immunized testimony, see
United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977).
42. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1976) ("upon the request of the United States
attorney").
43. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); State v. Buchanan, 110 Ariz. 285,518
P.2d 108 (1974); State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662 (N.D. 1976).
44. See also 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976) (giving the attorney general the power to re-
quest an immunity order).
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in the prosecution.45
Because the purpose of immunity is to override the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, a witness must first invoke
the privilege before the prosecution may seek immunity.46 Once the
court sustains the witness's claim of privilege as valid,47 the prosecution
may exercise its discretion and petition the court to immunize the wit-
ness. The court then acts upon the request according to the require-
ments of the statute.48
Broad statutory criteria establish circumstances under which an
immunity grant is appropriate. Typically, the proposed immunity must
serve the "public interest" or further the "interest of justice."49 Discre-
tion to determine whether or not these tests are met is vested in the
45. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 110 Ariz. 285, 518 P.2d 108 (1974).
Courts examining the history and purpose of immunity statutes usually discern a clear
legislative intent to aid in the state's investigation of crime. See, e.g., State v. Carchidi, 187
Wis. 438, 204 N.W. 473 (1925). "[T]o ascertain the legislative intent, we may look to the evil
to be remedied and the evident purpose of the legislation. When we do that, taking into
consideration the development of criminal law in this country, the difficulties that the public
have encountered in securing convictions in certain classes of cases, we have no doubt that
these statutes were passed for the express purpose of placing at the disposal of public prose-
cutors evidence which the [Fifth Amendment] provision denied." Id at 440, 204 N.W. at
475. Thus, whether by express provision or by principles of statutory construction, the pros-
ecution has authority to seek statutory immunity.
46. "[TIhe legislature did not intend to give something for nothing-i.e., to give immu-
nity merely in exchange for a testimonial disclosure which it could in any event have got by
ordinary rules or by the witness' failure to insist on his privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
3, at 516. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(2) (1976) (allowing immunity request when the individual
"has refused or is likely to refuse to testify ... on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination" (emphasis added)).
47. The trial judge may determine that the witness has no foundation for invoking the
Fifth Amendment privilege. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472,
478 n.12, 480-81 (1972); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). In some cir-
cumstances, there may even be a duty to inquire into the validity of the claim. United States
v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1975) (error not to inquire); Norman v. State, 588
S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (allowing spurious claim of privilege without in-
quiry held a denial of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses).
"To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question,
in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation
of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result."
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. at 486-87.
48. Statutes often vest no discretion in the court to deny the immunity request. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1976) (the court "shall issue" a compulsion order "upon the re-
quest of the United States attorney"). See In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977). "Under no circumstances... may a federal court .. .determine
whether application for an immunity order [under 18 U.S.C. § 6003] is necessary, advisable
or reflective of the public interest." Id at 479. Absent express statutory authority to partici-
pate in the immunity decision, a trial court's role may be limited to determining whether or
not procedural requirements have been met. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 433-34 (1956).
49. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1976) ("necessary to the public interest"); MICH.
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prosecutor, in the court, or in both. The federal general immunity stat-
ute,5 o for example, leaves the determination to the sole discretion of the
prosecutor,5' and the court must grant the immunity requested.5 2
Other statutes give the court authority to deny the request if the court
determines that the statutory test is not met.53 Regardless of the proce-
dure employed, the "public interest" and "interest of justice" tests both
require balancing the potential benefit of having the witness's testi-
mony against the cost to society of surrendering the right to prosecute
that witness. 4
C. Immunity for the Defense's Benefit
L Threshold Analytical Problems
The long acceptance in Anglo-American jurisprudence of statuto-
rily granted immunity55 has made it conceptually difficult to analyze
the inherent source of the government's immunity power, and hence to
discover what access a criminal defendant has to witness immunity.
Case law has established beyond doubt that the legislature may make
government's immunity power available-usually to the executive-as-
prosecutor-through statutes.5 6 A criminal defendant might thus seek
witness immunity through either of two branches of government:
(1) the executive branch, through the request of the prosecutor,57 or
(2) the legislative branch, by direct use of the statute.5 8 Both of these
STAT. ANN. § 28.1287(101) (1968) ("in the interest ofjustice"); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-2 (1966)
("that the ends of justice may be promoted").
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976) ("United States attorney may . . . request an order
... when in his judgment..." (emphasis added)). See note 48 supra.
52. See note 48 supra.
53. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1287(101) (1968) ("If the judge to whom the appli-
cation is presented is satisfied that it is in the interest of justice, he shall enter an order
granting immunity"). The purpose of giving the court discretionary veto power over the
prosecution is to guard against abuse. By requiring a more neutral, independent assessment
of what will best serve the declared statutory purpose, it guards against capricious use of the
statute by a prosecutor who might use it, for instance, to build impressive conviction records.
See Mykkeltvedt, supra note 8, at 701.
54. It has been suggested that modern use and derivative use immunity is less costly to
society than is the older transactional immunity. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 494
F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
But see Flanagan, Compelled Immuni yfor Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and Questions,
56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 447, 456-63 (1981); Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity and
Watergate, 56 Tnx. L. Rnv. 791 (1978).
55. See notes 24-30 and accompanying text supra.
56. Immunity power originates in the legislature and is "conferred by Congress on the
Executive" branch, Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 921 (1967).
57. See notes 86-95 and accompanying text infra.
58. See notes 96-107 and accompanying text infra.
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avenues, however, are premised on the exercise of statutory authority;
the controversial question is whether immunity may be obtained in-
dependent of statutory authority through the third branch of govern-
ment, the judiciary. 9 Courts are sharply divided on that question. 0
Two conceptual problems, both growing out of traditional statu-
tory immunity, obscure the analysis of inherent judicial power to exer-
cise the government's immunity prerogative. First, relying on the
historical development of statutory immunity as a prosecutorial aid,
immunity is often rigidly perceived as an exclusively legislative or exec-
utive power. Second, following early case law explanations of immu-
nity, misleading analogies are made to other governmental powers in
order to bolster the notion that immunity is the exclusive power of one
or another branch of government.
a. Immunity as an "Exclusively" Legislative or Executive Power
Because immunity historically has been conferred only by statute,
the power to grant immunity has been misconceived as solely legisla-
tive and as a practical matter, defense access to witness immunity has
been restricted by the lack of statutory authorization. This reliance on
statutory authority confuses the legislative branch's power to legislate
(an exclusive power, subject only to executive approval)62 with its
power to immunize. The power to immunize is common to all
branches of government as an inherent constitutional power and does
not depend on any concurrent power to legislate.63 Additionally, the
government's past exercise of its immunity power in solely statutory
form does not delimit its future exercise of that power.
Just as immunity's historically statutory form has led to the "ex-
clusively legislative" misconception, the historically exclusive statutory
authority of the prosecutor, a representative of the executive branch, to
initiate immunity grants6" has led to the misconception of immunity as
an "exclusively executive" power.65 In this light, it is clear that the
executive's "exclusive" power properly refers to statutory authority
rather than to inherent constitutional power. Moreover, modem stat-
59. See notes 169-75 and accompanying text infra.
60. See notes 176-91 and accompanying text infra.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962-63 (6th Cir. 1980); Earl v. United
States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
62. The problem presented by unilateral legislative action is discussed in note 68 infra.
See also note 67 infra.
63. See notes 192-99 and accompanying text infra. See also Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 972 (1979) ("sole discretion of the executive branch").
65. See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading
the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
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utes which allow the defense to initiate immunity requests directly 66
make even the assumption of exclusive statutory authority inaccurate.
Both federal and state constitutions require the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches to enact statutes by cooperative effort.67 Even when
confined to the context of statutory immunity, the power to immunize
can thus be, in a technical sense, neither exclusively legislative nor ex-
clusively executive. Failure to distinguish this point is insignificant
from a practical standpoint because it is well settled that the power to
confer immunity may be statutorily delegated through joint action by
the legislative and executive branches.68 Beyond the context of statu-
tory immunity, however, indiscriminate reference to exclusive legisla-
tive or executive power can result in confusion of statutory with
inherent immunity power.69
b. Confusion from the Use of Analogies
Because the Constitution makes no express provision for the gov-
ernment's immunity power, early court decisions upholding the consti-
tutional validity of immunity relied in part on convenient analogies to
express constitutional powers. Comparisons with executive pardon70
and legislative lawmaking powers71 were especially attractive because,
when taken together, they demonstrate an alternate means of validat-
ing joint legislative and executive enactment of immunity statutes--one
which avoids the difficult question of whether or not there exists in
66. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 57-5-2 (1966).
67. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, which requires that each bill originating in
Congress, "before it become a Law, be presented to the President" for approval, and which
also provides for congressional override of the President's veto. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-2 (1978).
68. The constitutionality of a federal immunity statute was first upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in 1892. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
An entirely different question is presented when the legislature tries to grant immunity
unilaterally. The problem arose in Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931), in
which a joint resolution of both houses of the New York legislature purported to confer
immunity on persons testifying before a joint legislative committee. The resolution was held
ineffective for lack of the Governor's approval. Id at 257-58, 177 N.E. at 493-94. Writing
for the court, Chief Justice Cardozo observed: "We beg the question when we argue that the
Legislature may give immunity because the Legislature is the sole custodian of the legisla-
tive power. . . . The power is divided between the Legislature and the Governor ....
The Legislature can initiate, but without the action of the Governor it is powerless to com-
plete." Id at 261, 177 N.E. at 495. The problem encountered in Doyle is unlikely to occur
today, however, because immunity statutes passed by joint legislative and executive action
now commonly encompass legislative investigations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1976).
69. See text accompanying notes 192-99 infra.
70. See note 81 infra. For an extensive comparison of imminity to executive pardon,
see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600-01 (1896).
71. See generally U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The legislative power to define and to pre-
scribe penalties for crimes is discussed in notes 74-79 and accompanying text infra.
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each branch of government an inherent power to grant immunity.7 2
Later courts, able to cite the earlier decisions as precedent and confin-
ing themselves to statutory immunity, kept alive the earlier courts'
analogies and largely ignored the underlying governmental immunity
power question.73
The development of a constitutionally based right to criminal de-
fense witness immunity has been hampered by continued adherence to
immunity analogies. Such analogies obscure the deeper immunity
power question and, because there are no express constitutional provi-
sions regarding judicial power, tend to reinforce the misconception that
the government's immunity power resides exclusively with either the
executive or legislative branch.
Immunity has been likened to a legislative act suspending criminal
penalties. 74 The analogy offers a convenient rationalization of the leg-
islature's power to grant immunity by statute.75 Historically, the com-
parison has proved satisfactory because a grant of immunity was
always transactional. Transactional immunity provides immunity for
any "transaction, matter or thing" 76 testified to and is in that respect
closely akin to the suspension of a criminal penalty. Today, with the
advent of use and derivative use immunity,77 the analogy is less apt.
Use immunity protects only against the use of compelled testimony and
of any other evidence to which that testimony directly or indirectly
leads; it does not provide blanket immunity for the underlying offense.
The individual may still be prosecuted by using evidence "derived
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony."7" Use and derivative use immunity thus is not the same as a
72. For an analysis of government's inherent immunity power, see notes 192-99 and
accompanying text infra.
73. Courts avoid having to reexamine the inherent source of immunity power by relying
on precedent. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Supreme Court was willing to
lean on admittedly meager precedent: "While the decisions of the English courts construing
such [immunity] acts are of little value here, . . . such decisions as have been made under
similar acts in this country are, with one or two exceptions, we believe, unanimous in favor
of their constitutionality." Id at 602.
74. See Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 40, 233 N.W.2d 420, 429 (1975); 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 5, at § 2281.
75. The "suspension of criminal penalty" analogy is based on the legislature's power to
declare certain conduct criminal and to prescribe penalties for violators. As explained in 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, "Penalty is the creation of the law, not an inherent attribute in the
act itself. It may therefore be taken away by the law. . . . The [Fifth Amendment] privi-
lege protects only against legal consequences of conduct; hence, the legal consequences lack-
ing, the privilege does not exist for such conduct." Id at 491. A grant of immunity, like a
fictional legislative suspension of penalty, leaves the criminalty of the underlying conduct
intact and merely removes the penal consequences.
76. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896) (emphasis omitted).
77. See note 37 supra.
78. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). See note 37 supra.
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suspension of criminal penalties, since the latter would unconditionally
bar all subsequent prosecution for the offense.
Closely related to the analogy just discussed is the analogy of im-
munity to a legislative act erasing the criminality of conduct.7 9 Instead
of comparing immunity to the suspension of criminal penalties, how-
ever, this analogy suggests that immunity retroactively expurgates the
underlying conduct of criminality, leaving the immunity recipient in-
nocent of wrongdoing. Again, this analogy is inapt as applied to use
immunity, which allows subsequent prosecution for the underlying
offense.
The concept of immunity has inspired other analogies to situations
which preclude or inhibit prosecuting a person who has committed
criminal acts. Analogies to a plea bargain agreement,80 to an executive
pardon or amnesty,8' to a judicial act suppressing evidence to redress a
constitutional wrong, and to a number of less convincing parallels8 3
79. See, e.g., State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307, 310 (1853) (immunized gambler in same
position as if legislature "were to repeal the statute of gaming" so that he had in effect
"committed no offence then known to the law"); State v. Nowell, 58 N.H. 314, 315-16 (1878)
(statutory immunity "is, in law, equivalent to. . . legal innocence of the crime disclosed").
Like the "suspension of criminal penalty" analogy, see note 75 supra, the "removal of
criminality" analogy is premised on the legislature's power to declare criminality of conduct.
Conversely, "the legislature may remove criminality for a class of persons or for an individ-
ual, as well as for a generic act." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 491.
80. See, e.g., Walters v. State, 394 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind. 1979).
81. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (immunity statute is "virtually
an act of general amnesty").
"The President.. . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States. .. ." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. A pardon effectively bars all
future prosecution and is in that respect similar to transactional immunity, but Justice Pow-
ell has observed that a pardon is not an appropriate analogy to modem use immunity. Such
a statute, "like the Fifth Amendment, grants neither pardon nor amnesty. Both the statute
and the Fifth Amendment allow the government to prosecute using evidence from legitimate
independent sources." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972). For a compari-
son of transactional and use immunity, see note 37 .-upra.
Some courts have perceived a crucial distinction between amnesty and pardon. Doyle v.
Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 248-49, 177 N.E. 489, 493-94 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.). But see
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), in which the Court agrees that "'the distinction
between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance."' Id at 601
(quoting Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877)).
82. Modem use and derivative use immunity has inspired this new analogy. "Immu-
nity from use is the only consequence flowing from a violation of the individual's constitu-
tional right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, his constitutional right
to counsel, and his constitutional right not to be coerced into confessing. The proposed [use
and derivative use] immunity is thus of the same scope as that frequently, even though
unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional violations by law enforcement of-
ficers." WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMM. ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS 1446 (1970) (Second Interim Report, Mar. 17, 1969). Contra Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 470-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("An immunity statute...
differs from an exclusionary rule of evidence in at least two critical respects").
83. Further analogies to situations wherein criminal acts cannot be punished are possi-
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have been proffered.
Analogies are inadequate to explain government's inherent immu-
nity power because they obscure the distinction between express and
implied governmental powers.84 Proper analysis should be based on
the function of immunity in our constitutional system as a substitute for
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth
Amendment limits all branches of government. Each branch has in-
herent power to displace that privilege when an assertion of the privi-
lege seriously interferes with its functions. The limited past use of
government's immunity power in statutory form should not be inter-
preted as limiting future use of that power. Analogies detract from
proper analysis because they reinforce the misconception that immu-
nity is a solely legislative or a solely executive power.
These analytical problems grow out of statutory immunity con-
cepts and, as is shown in Part II, they impede the development of non-
statutory immunity. Having first focused on these analytical problems,
we now look at the deficiencies of statutory immunity available to the
defense.
2. Defense Witness Immunity at the Request of the Prosecution
The defense, although lacking statutory authority to petition the
court directly in most jurisdictions, may seek witness immunity through
the prosecution.86 While this avenue is always open to the defense, the
chances for its success are limited. The decision whether or not to
grant immunity is a policy judgment and requires considerable lati-
tude.87 In choosing which witnesses to immunize, the prosecutor is
ble. Exparte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524,38 P. 364 (1894) (trial and acquittal, conviction and fully
served sentence); Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 248, 177 N.E. 489, 493 (193 1) (statute of
limitations).
84. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 192-99 and accompanying text infra.
86. Some jurisdictions do have statutes which allow the defense to directly petition the
court for immunty. See, e.g., note 96 and accompanying text infra. Distinguish the situation
in which the prosecution grants immunity to a co-defendant whose testimony will aid the
prosecution. A defendant generally cannot challenge a grant of immunity to an adverse
witness. United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975) (no standing to challenge).
Among members of the same class, however, i.e., between co-defendants, an equal protec-
tion argument can be made given that the prosecution's selection of one defendant over
another to receive immunity is arbitrary or without a rational basis. The courts have sum-
marily rejected this argument as without merit. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d
1302, 1315 (8th Cir. 1977) ("patently unreasonable").
A due process challenge to the prosecution's selection of one defendant over another
similarly fails unless the prosecution exercises its discretion in a deliberately unfair manner.
United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976); People v. Williams, 11 Cal. App. 3d
1156, 90 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970). See generaly Note, Selective Use of the Executive Immrunity
Power: A Denial of Due Process?, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 879 (1980).
87. See note 89 infra.
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usually guided only by the statutory requirement of public interest, and
that judgment is often left to that official's sole discretion.8 8 The prose-
cutor's concept of public interest is often limited to law enforcement
interests. 9 Consequently, defense requests for immunity through the
prosecution are routinely denied.90
Statutes that allow the prosecution to seek immunity without pro-
viding the defense with a reciprocal right have been challenged on
equal protection grounds.9 1 Although the United States Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue,92 several state supreme courts
have examined and sustained the validity of nonreciprocal immunity
statutes.93 The state-as-prosecutor and the defendant are not consid-
ered similarly situated; hence, their disparate treatment under the stat-
ute is justified if it is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.94
Since the itate's legitimate interest in prosecuting criminals is aided by
immunizing prosecution rather than defense witnesses, the statute with-
stands scrutiny.95
3. Direct Defense Use of the Statute
Some statutes vest discretion in the court to grant or to deny all
immunity requests, whether they emanate from the defense or from the
prosecution.96 By taking discretion to refuse immunity away from the
prosecution, these statutes lessen the risk that defense requests will be
unfairly denied. Authority for direct defense use of the statute may be
88. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976) (the prosecutor may request immunity when "in his judg-
ment... the testimony or other information ... may be necessary to the public interest").
See also note 48 supra.
89. Some courts also view the public interest narrowly. "[The decision whether to con-
fer immunity in order to facilitate the government's investigation is the product of the bal-
ancing of the public need for the particular testimony or documentary information in
question against the social cost of granting immunity and thereby precluding the possibility
of criminally prosecuting an individual who has violated the criminal law. Therefore, the
relative importance of particular testimony to... law enforcement interests is a judgmental
... determination." In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1977).
90. For a discussion of the statistical success of defense witness applications and official
federal policies regarding such requests, see Mykkeltvedt, supra note 8, at 692-93.
91. See, e.g., notes 92-93 infra.
92. The Court "has repeatedly examined nonreciprocal immunity statutes, without any
indication of their constitutional infirmity from this point of view." Peters v. State, 75 Wis.
2d 22, 40, 233 N.W.2d 420, 430 (1975).
93. Id See also State v. McCown, 189 Neb. 495, 203 N.W.2d 445 (1973); Sanders v.
State, 69 Wis. 2d 242, 230 N.W.2d 845 (1975).
94. See generall, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
95. "The State alone has the responsibility of prosecuting crimes. To meet that respon-
sibility, the State, not the defendant, must have the authority to grant immunity." Walters v.
State, 394 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind. 1979).
96. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 57-5-2 (1966).
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expressly given or may be implied from ambiguous statutory
language.97
Courts traditionally have construed ambiguous statutes as limited
to use only by the prosecution.9" These courts have been reluctant to
intrude into a historically prosecutorial function or to create the oppor-
tunity for collusive use of immunity by the defense. 9 Concern that "a
person suspected of crime should not be empowered to give his confed-
erates an immunity bath"o has been an especially strong factor weigh-
ing against allowing direct defense access to immunity. Courts also
hesitate to create a situation which might invite "cooperative perjury
among law violators.'1°1
In modem practice, however, subsequent prosecution by in-
dependent evidence is allowed despite a grant of use and derivative use
immunity, creating less of an immunity-bath effect.'0 2 Also, coopera-
tive perjury is discouraged by knowledge that perjured testimony is not
immunized.1 3 In view of the recent trend toward allowing defense re-
quests and placing discretion with the court, perhaps more statutes will
be interpreted as providing defense use of immunity."4
A statute which allows the defense to request witness immunity
directly and which gives the court discretion to grant or deny the re-
quest accomplishes two objectives. First, it allows the defendant access
to immunity without risking the prosecutor's veto. The court can di-
rectly consider the merits of the request and might weigh the public
97. Ambiguities may arise in two ways. One is a statute that vests discretion in the
court to rule on immunity requests but fails to state which party may initiate the request.
The other is a statute that expressly authorizes prosecution requests for immunity but is
silent as to defense requests.
98. United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975);
State v. Buchanan, 110 Ariz. 285, 288-89, 518 P.2d 108, 111-12 (1974) (citing other states'
decisions).
99. For a careful analysis of these factors and an examination of legislative intent, see
State v. Buchanan, 110 Ariz. 285, 518 P.2d 108 (1974). See also Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 22,
233 N.W.2d 420 (1975).
100. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
101. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
1077 (1981). "Co-defendants could secure . . . immunity for each other, and each immu-
nized witness could exonerate his co-defendant at a separate trial by falsely accepting sole
responsibility for the crime, secure in the knowledge that his admission could not be used at
his own trial for the substantive offense. . . .Moreover, this maneuver would substantially
undermine the opportunity for joint trials, with consequent expense, delay, and burden upon
disinterested witnesses and the judicial system." Id at 775-76.
102. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824
(1976). See note 54 supra.
103. Contra United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
1077 (1981). "The threat of a perjury conviction, with penalties frequently far below sub-
stantive offenses, could not be relied upon to prevent such tactics." Id at 775.
104. For an example of how an ambiguous statute might be interpreted as allowing di-
rect use by the defense, see State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974).
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interests more broadly and objectively than would the prosecutor. 05
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the defense obtains recourse to
appellate review of the trial court's ruling. The trial court's grant or
denial of immunity involves the exercise of discretion, and its ruling
may be overturned on appeal if it is found to result from an abuse of
that discretion.'0 6 Admittedly, this is a limited scope of review, but at
least it prevents egregious injustice and protects a defendant against
judicial bias. Another advantage of abuse of discretion review is that
although the same circumstances which constitute an abuse of discre-
tion might, for example, constitute a denial of due process, such review
is not limited to the question of whether the defendant was denied a
constitutional right. 10 7 The statutory scheme described above probably
offers the best solution to the problem of defense witness immunity.
While constitutional violations may still result from the denial of im-
munity, the double safeguards of court discretion and appellate abuse
of discretion review should all but eliminate them.
II. Immunity as a Remedy for Constitutional Wrongs
A defendant is falsely accused of murder. At trial, eyewitnesses A
and B testify with certainty that they saw the defendant commit the crime.
Eyewitness C could testfy instead that the actual murderer was a person
who looks strikingly like the defendant. When called by the defense to
testify, C invokes the privilege against self-incrimination forfear of re-
vealing his complicity in the murder. The prosecutor, knowing that C s
proposed testimony would establish the defendant's innocence, and lack-
ing any other evidence with which to build a case against C, refuses the
defense's request to immunize C.
In a circumstance such as the one described above, the denial of
defense witness immunity is so grossly unfair that it offends the Consti-
tution. To allow witness immunity for the government's convenience
and yet deny witness immunity to an innocent defendant who depends
on it to preserve his life or liberty is a violation of due process of law.
Due process of law, which is premised on "fundamental notions of fair-,, 08
ness, is a flexible provision, responsive to "the increasing experience
and evolving conscience of the American people .. ,, 109 Its inherent
flexibility, however, makes it cumbersome to apply, requiring in each
case a painstaking evaluation of all circumstances. Restrictive
105. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra. See also State v. Broady, 41 Ohio
App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974).
106. State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974).
107. See text accompanying notes 109-91 infra.
108. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
109. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 (1968) (Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
110. Justice Frankfurter noted that "[i]n each case 'due process of law' requires an evalu-
ation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of
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guidelines for its application to defense witness immunity are needed to
render it a more manageable and predictable tool at the trial court
level 1' and to discourage routine due process challenges to every de-
nial of immunity. These concerns have prompted a search for more
narrow constitutional guarantees which might accommodate a right to
defense witness immunity." 2  In particular, the confrontation 1 3 and
compulsory process" 4 clauses of the Sixth Amendment have attracted
interest because they both involve a defendant's right to put witnesses
on the stand.
Once the source of constitutional protection is identified and
found to be violated, what form of relief is appropriate? To begin with,
the redress of constitutional wrongs is properly a judicial function. As
the responsible guardians of individual rights, courts not only must dis-
cem impermissible infringements of those rights, but also must fashion
appropriate remedies. 5 As to the choice of remedy, the most drastic
form of relief available to a court is its power to dismiss an indictment
or to reverse a conviction. Rather than suffer dismissal, the govern-
ment might agree to grant defense witness immunity in return for the
opportunity to proceed with trial. Alternatively, instead of having a
conviction reversed on appeal, the government might agree to grant
immunity on retrial. The final and most divisive question is whether a
court has inherent remedial power to grant immunity directly without
going through the prosecutorial apparatus.
A. The Constitutional Source of Protection
L Specfic Trial Guarantees
In the 1960's, the last remaining unincorporated trial guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment were held applicable to the states.1 6 The protec-
facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims." Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
111. "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and
thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice."' Id at 173.
112. In 1967, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, observed that "in recent years
we have increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to determine
whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law." Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
113. See note 117 and accompanying text infra.
114. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
115. While statutes can be drafted so as to protect individual rights in common situa-
tions, they can neither anticipate nor provide solutions for every possible infringement.
Abuse of a statute, for example, is usually not contemplated by its drafters. Further, legisla-
tive line drawing may err on the side of overprotection in order to withstand anticipated
constitutional challenge. In the context of immunity, this would result in many instances in
which the public interest would be sacrificed to caution.
116. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v.
[Vol. 9:199
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
tions so guaranteed were explored one by one and were found to be
indispensable to Fourteenth Amendment due process. With the Sixth
Amendment fully incorporated, all that remains is to find a right to
defense witness immunity implicit in one of its provisions for the im-
munity right to be constitutionally secured.
One possible source of immunity is the confrontation clause,
which guarantees the defendant's right "to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him . . ,"17 In a general sense, the protection pre-
vents interference with the defendant's right to call witnesses, ' 8 but it
is apparently limited to calling witnesses against the defendant. While
an adverse witness may sometimes also have favorable testimony to
give, the confrontation clause protection seems principally aimed at the
defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses as to their incrimi-
nating, rather than exculpating, testimony."' 9
A more promising source of defense witness immunity is the de-
fendant's right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor. ''20 This counterpart to the right of confrontation applies to
favorable witnesses and would at first appear to include a right to de-
fense witness immunity.' 2 1 The plain language of the provision, how-
ever, promises only the attendance of a witness. There is no express
promise that the witness, once called, will be forced to testify over a
claim of privilege. 122
Whatever the theoretical merits of grounding a right to defense
witness immunity on the compulsory process clause,'23 it has been al-
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
118. See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unpied Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978).
119. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). But see United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d
1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
121. Westen, supra note 118. See also Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH.
L. REV. 71, 166-70 (1974).
122. "Traditionally, the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause gives the de-
fendant the right to bring his witness to court and have the witness's non-privileged testi-
mony heard, but does not carry with it the additional right to displace a proper claim of
privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination." United States v. Turkish, 623
F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1077 (1981). Accord United States v.
Lenz, 616 F.2d 960 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980); United States v. Klauber, 611
F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d
916 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978); United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968);
State v. Simms, 170 Conn. 206, 365 A.2d 821, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976). But see
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-48 (1972).
123. Application of compulsory process to defense witness immunity could be inferred
from the Supreme Court's language in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), in which
the Court stated that "[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile
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most uniformly rejected by the courts.' 24 Their reluctance stems from a
fear that use of compulsory process in the context of defense witness
immunity would strain the guarantee far beyond its history and pur-
pose. 125 A stronger cause for caution is the Supreme Court's apparent
shift toward more expansive due process inquiry. Having exhausted
the specific Sixth Amendment provisions by incorporating them into
due process, 26 the Court is faced with two alternatives: either stretch
the specific guarantees to fit newly discovered rights or look to the "in-
dependent potency"'127 of due process. 128
Beginning in the 1960's, the Court has favored an all-inclusive due
process approach to criminal proceedings. 129 This inquiry focuses on
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony
he had no right to use." Id at 23. That case, however, involved a state evidentiary rule
which disqualified coparticipants in crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Id at
16-17. In reversing the conviction, the Court was careful to limit itself by noting, "Nothing
in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privi-
lege against self-incrimination... which are based on entirely different considerations from
those underlying the common law disqualifications for interest." Id at 23 n.21.
124. See note 122 supra. See also United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978); Imwinkelried, The Constitutional Right to Pres-
ent Defense Evidence, 62 MIL. L. REv. 225, 240, 252-53 (1973) (criticizing Chief Justice War-
ren's reasoning in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
Judicial reluctance to accept compulsory process as a foundation is no doubt due in part
to the lack of precedent. See United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 929 (1980). "So far as we are aware, no court has held that compulsory process requires
the Government to exercise its statutory use-immunity power affirmatively for a defendant's
benefit." Id at 962. But see note 167 infra (a discussion of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals' purported reliance on compulsory process in Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1980)).
125. For a discussion of the historical context surrounding the clauses inclusion in the
Bill of Rights, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1967).
126. See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
127. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
128. Justice Frankfurter expressed the importance of independent due process review.
"A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a sum-
mary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would... assume that no other abuses
would reveal themselves in the course of time than those which had become manifest in
1791. Such a view not only disregards the historic meaning of 'due process.' It leads inevita-
bly to a warped construction of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to bring within their
scope conduct clearly condemned by due process but not easily fitting into the pigeon-holes
of the specific provisions." Id at 67.
129. See generally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 742-95 (1976).
Periodically, United States Supreme Court Justices have indicated their dissatisfaction
with sole reliance on the incorporationist view and have stated their preference for an in-
dependent due process analysis. Justice Harlan asked the Court to "reconsider the 'incorpo-
ration' doctrine before its leveling tendencies further retard development in the field of
criminal procedure by stifling flexibility in the States and by discarding the possibility of
federal leadership by example." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 138 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23-25 (1967), Justice
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the right to present a defense and the right to a fair trial. Both of these
overlapping concepts describe the spirit of due process protection in the
context of a criminal trial 3 ' and avoid the constraining probe into spe-
cific trial guarantees.
2 General Due Process
Due process of law is the ultimate measure of the constitutionality
of criminal proceedings.' 3 ' It embodies a defendant's right to a fair
trial 32 and his right to present a defense. 133
The right to present a defense is implied from the Sixth Amend-
ment trial guarantees. 34 In Washington v. Texas, 35 the decision which
incorporated compulsory process into Fourteenth Amendment due
process, the Supreme Court noted broadly that "It]he right to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is
in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury
so it may decide where the truth lies,"' 136 and deemed the right "a fun-
damental element of due process of law."' 137  Washington suggests a
Harlan rejected the Court's compulsory process approach and premised his concurrence on
a due process analysis. Justice Powell has also felt uncomfortable with the Court's reliance
on incorporationist standards. In a case passing on the constitutionality of a state's less-
than-unanimous jury verdicts for criminal trials, Justice Powell observed, "[I]t is the Four-
teenth Amendment, rather than the Sixth, that imposes upon the States the requirement that
they provide jury trials. . . .The question, therefore,. . . is whether unanimity is in fact
so fundamental to the essentials of jury trial that this particular requirement of the Sixth
Amendment is necessarily binding on the States under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 371-73 (1972) (concurring
opinion).
130. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The right to a fair trial is a
fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in es-
sence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations").
131. "The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings which resulted in con-
viction deprived the accused of the due process of law to which the United States Constitu-
tion entitled him." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (concurring opinion).
132. "A right to a fair trial is a right admittedly protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . . The purpose of due process is not to protect an accused
against a proper conviction but against an unfair conviction." Id. at 53-57. See also United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
133. See generally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711 (1976); Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to
Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1266 (1978); Note, The
Use of a Witness'r Privilegefor the Benefit of a Defendant, 37 LA. L. REv. 1244 (1977).
134. "In short, the [Sixth] Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary crimi-
nal trial to make a defense as we know it." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975)
(citation omitted).
135. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
136. Id at 19 (emphasis added).
137. Id
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possible right to defense witness immunity where necessary to bring out
"the defendant's version of the facts."'13 8
Another due process mandate, first announced in Brady v. Mary-
land,139 is the prosecution's duty to disclose material defense evi-
dence. 140 The disclosure requirement easily could have been analyzed
under the right to present a defense,141 but the Brad, rule was premised
directly on due process. 42 The Burger Court has commented that
"[t]he heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's suppression of
evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evi-
dence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to
punishment."'143 The Brady rule can be interpreted as requiring de-
fense witness immunity, since a request for witness immunity is essen-
tially a request for the production of evidence which the prosecution
alone has the authority to produce. If the proposed testimony is shown,
perhaps by in camera disclosure,'" to be materially exculpatory, the
defense witness would have to be immunized.
In Earl v. United States,145 then District of Columbia Circuit
Judge Burger rejected the notion that the Brady rule could be the basis
for court ordered defense witness immunity. 14 That holding, however,
does not necessarily foreclose the Brady argument. First, the ruling in
Earl stressed the court's lack of statutory authority to grant immu-
nity.147 Cases since have recognized that a court may order a dismissal
instead of intruding on the prosecution's exclusive statutory author-
ity.148 Faced with that prospect, the prosecution might be willing to
138. Id
139. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
140. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id at 87.
141. In Washington, for example, testimony of the disqualified witness "would have been
relevant and material, and ... vital to the defense." 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967). That case
involved the right to present a defense. See notes 135-37 supra. Similarly, the conduct of
the prosecution in Brady in refusing to divulge material evidence interfered with the defend-
ant's right to present a defense.
142. See note 140 supra.
143. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972).
144. See Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense
Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 1266, 1274 n.60 (1978).
145. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
146. "We conclude that the judicial creation of a procedure comparable to that enacted
by Congress for the benefit of the Government is beyond our power." Id at 534.
147. Id
148. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S.
913 (1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824
(1976). For other possible court sanctions, see United States v. DePaima, 476 F. Supp. 775
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1076 (1981). See also Note, A Re-examination of De-
fense Witness Immunity: A New Usefor Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 74, 90-91 (1972).
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exercise its statutory authority for the benefit of the defense. Second,
Judge Burger suggested hypothetically that the government's use of the
statute to secure eyewitness testimony for its own use while refusing to
secure eyewitness testimony for the defense's benefit could constitute a
denial of due process. 149 The Earl holding thus left open the possibility
of constitutionally mandated defense witness immunity.
The fundamental due process requirement of fairness offers the
best hope of identifying the constitutionally based right to defense wit-
ness immunity.' 50 The fairness required in criminal trials is more than
an amalgam of specific trial guarantees; it provides protection where
the specific provisions will not be expanded to cover newly perceived
abuses.' 5' The obvious difficulty in its application, however, is that
courts need more specific criteria for adjudication than the "right to a
fair trial" or the "right to present a defense."'5 2
In Virgin Islands v. Smith," 3 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
established a two-prong test for identifying situations in which due pro-
cess mandates defense witness immunity. The court consolidated and
tailored two of its prior decisions, United States v. Morrison154 and
United States v. Herman,5 1 to devise a unified approach to the prob-
lem. In Morrison, the court held that when prosecutorial misconduct
causes a defense witness to be unavailable and the government subse-
quently refuses to immunize that witness, a court should exercise its
remedial power of acquittal unless, on retrial, the government agrees to
grant statutory use immunity.156 The court in Herman affirmed the rul-
ing in Morrison but limited the coercive remedy as appropriate only
upon a showing that the government's decision to deny immunity was
made "with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial factflnd-
ing process."' 57 In Smith, the court incorporated the modified Morri-
son test "with full recognition that a court seriously intrudes into the
realm of the executive when it orders the government to grant statutory
149. 361 F.2d at 534 n.l.
150. See generaly Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutonal
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. Rav. 711 (1976); Note, Right of the Criminal Defend-
ant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 953 (1967).
151. See note 128 supra.
152. See note II supra. Inability to affix the right to a specific Sixth Amendment guar-
antee and reluctance to open the question to vague due process notions have probably inhib-
ited case law development. Many opinions express support for defense witness immunity
but are unable to find a comfortable basis for recognizing that right. See, e.g., United States
v. Feeney, 501 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1980) (mem.).
153. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
154. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
155. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
156. 535 F.2d at 229. Morrison involved the prosecution's intimidation of the principal
defense witness to the point where the witness feared to testify and invoked the self-incrimi-
nation privilege. Id
157. 589 F.2d at 1204. See note 165 infra.
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immunity .... ,"158 It thus restricted the remedy to clear instances of
prosecutorial bad faith.159 The second prong of the Smith due process
inquiry was first advanced in Herman. It is based on a defendant's
right to have exculpatory evidence presented to the jury160 and on the
right to compulsory process. 16  That "the court has inherent authority
to effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring ju-
dicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essen-
tial to an effective defense"' 62 was proposed in Herman.
Deferring for now a discussion of the proposed remedy, 63 the
choice of constitutional bases in Herman is interesting as a starting
point for understanding the restrictions subsequently placed on use of
that remedy by the court in Smith. In adopting the remedy as the sec-
ond prong of its due process inquiry, the court imposed five safeguards:
"[Ilmmunity must be properly sought in the district court; the defense
witness must be available to testify; the proffered testimony must be
clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be
no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of
immunity."'1  The reasons for imposing these safeguards are as fol-
lows: (1) requiring that immunity requests be made in the trial court
gives the court notice of the source and substance of proposed testi-
mony, and prevents spurious requests on appeal; (2) the witness cannot
be unavailable by reason of another valid testimonial privilege or the
grant of immunity would be futile; (3) allowing immunity only for es-
sential and exculpatory evidence ensures a high degree of constitu-
tional necessity and satisfies the case law requirement of materiality;
and (4) the court should not intervene where the public interest out-
weighs the defendant's need. 165
158. 615 F.2d at 968. See Note, Separation ofPowers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66
GEo. L.J. 51 (1977).
159. For a similar analysis of due process as affected by prosecutorial misconduct, see
People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 359 N.E.2d 688, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 823 (1977).
The Third Circuit's strict requirement of intentional distortion of the factfinding pro-
cess is, in essence, a policy decision to intrude on the government's law enforcement interests
only when it safely appears that those interests are illegitimate or nonexistent.
160. The Herman and Smith opinions both relied heavily on Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the Supreme Court held that state evidentiary rules that
prevented the defendant from introducing trustworthy, exculpatory evidence denied the de-
fendant his due process right to present an effective defense. Id at 302.
161. See note 167 infra.
162. 589 F.2d at 1204.
163. For a discussion ofjudicially fashioned immunity, see notes 169-84 and accompany-
ing text infra.
164. 615 F.2d at 972.
165. Throughout the Smith opinion, the court conscientiously noted case law precedent,
taking the trouble to distinguish unfavorable decisions. The court also sought to reconcile
its holdings with important Supreme Court pronouncements wherever possible. See, eg.,
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The two-prong due process test in Smith achieves a balanced ac-
commodation of the defendant's and the government's competing in-
terests. The test gives the court rigid criteria for disposing of
groundless immunity claims and yet leaves it with ample leeway for
further inquiry. 66 It allows a careful weighing of interests, uninhibited
by specific Sixth Amendment provisions. 67 Most importantly, it could
serve as a prototype for other jurisdictions to adopt and refine. 168
B. The Appropriate Remedy
The paramount rule of statutory immunity is that, absent express
authority, 69 a court may not utilize the statute and may not command
615 F.2d at 972-73 nn. 11 & 13. A special effort was made to conform to Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The Smith decision points out that "the safeguards which we
mandate.., are common to those found in Chambers .... Of crucial significance to the
Supreme Court's decision in Chambers, was the clearly exculpatory and essential nature of
the evidence which was excluded." 615 F.2d at 972. With reference to the prosecutorial
misconduct prong of the Smith text, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) ("accuracy
of the truth-determining process"); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) ("integrity
of the fact-finding process").
166. The countervailing governmental interest safeguard seems particularly flexible. The
opinion suggests postponement, sterilization of testimony, and assembly of all the evidence
necessary to prosecute the witness before immunity is granted as means to mitigate the
"cost" of granting immunity. 615 F.2d at 973.
167. The Smith opinion refers to the second prong as based on compulsory process, but
the criteria employed are not limited to that analysis. Ultimately, both prongs are grounded
in due process terms. "We have discussed two theories in which dueprocess requires the
testimony of defense witnesses to be immunized." Id at 974 (emphasis added).
168. Lower federal court decisions in the Third Circuit that have applied the Smith stan-
dards include: United States v. Stout, 499 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (proffered testimony
not exculpatory and essential); United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980) (no
prosecutorial misconduct, testimony not clearly exculpatory, countervailing governmental
interest); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (problem of what consti-
tutes a "convincing showing" of essential and exculpatory nature of evidence). Courts in
other federal circuits have been cautious. See United States v. Barham, 625 F.2d 1221, 1226
(5th Cir. 1980) ("This circuit has not yet had occasion either to accept or to reject Morrison
and we need not do so today"); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981) ("We have no dispute with the holding in Smith. How-
ever,. . . we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with the standards outlined in that
decision"); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 193 (Ist Cir. 1980) ("We need not decide to
what extent we agree"); United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D. Colo. 1980)
("I fully agree with its first prong but... I disagree with the second part and elect not to
follow it"). State courts also have considered Smith. People v. Guyton, 620 P.2d 50 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1980) (witness is potential target of prosecution); People v. Macias, 616 P.2d 150
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (immunity not properly sought below); State v. McGee, 621 P.2d 1129
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (issue not raised in trial court); State v. Haverty, 267 S.E.2d 727 (W.
Va. 1980) (testimony merely corroborative). See also People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 760-
61,431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 429-30, 409 N.E.2d 897, 904-05 (1980) (violation of due process results
from intimidation of defense witness (without mention of S. .fth)).
169. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
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the prosecution to exercise its authority to secure defense testimony.1 70
Faced with this proscription, a court has two alternative ways to redress
a due process violation. The first is to impose sanctions unless the pros-
ecution agrees to immunize the defense witness. '7 1 A court has reme-
dial power to dismiss an indictment or to order an acquittal, and such
action may be preconditioned on the prosecution's refusal to grant de-
fense witness immunity on retrial. ,72 The second alternative is for the
court to grant immunity directly through its inherent remedial pow-
ers.' 73 This alternative effectuates immunity without resort to any stat-
utory authority of the prosecutor and thus avoids separation of powers
concerns' 74 that may arise from the first alternative, by which the pros-
ecution is in effect coerced into granting immunity.
175
Opposition to judicially fashioned immunity is based in part on
the established case law misconception that a court has no inherent
power to grant immunity.' 76 While the cases speak of intrusions into
the executive power and lack of judicial power, a distinction must be
made between inherent power to fashion relief in the form of immunity
and inherent power to exercise the prosecution's exclusive statutory au-
thority.' 77 No court has inherent power to utilize an immunity statute.
170. See United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980
(1978); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970
(1977); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976);
Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975);
United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
999 (1975); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
921 (1967). But see United States v. Gaither, 539 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., state-
ment on denial of rehearing), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Leonard,
494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Earl v.
United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
171. Courts have inherent equitable powers to secure their proceedings from abuse.
United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969).
172. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Klauber,
611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); United States v. DePalma, 476 F.
Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nonL United States v. Horwitz, 622
F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160,
359 N.E.2d 688, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
173. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
174. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
175. In "coerced" immunity situations, the prosecution ultimately makes the policy deci-
sion whether to forego prosecution or to grant immunity. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615
F.2d 964, 969-70, 974 (3d Cir. 1980). It is arguable that, when presented with the necessity
of protecting a defendant's due process rights, the final choice of whether to forego prosecu-
tion of the defendant or of the witness (assuming there is no independent evidence from
which to build a case against the witness) is a public policy judgment best left to the prosecu-
tion. The coerced immunity in this respect may be more acceptable than court ordered
immunity. See notes 185-91 and accompanying text infra.
176. See note 170 supra.
177. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1980).
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The power must be delegated, and most immunity statutes do not au-
thorize court use. 17 8 Unauthorized use of such a statute would clearly
violate separation of powers principles.7 9 On the other hand, immu-
nity fashioned as a remedy for constitutional wrongs is part of a court's
exclusive power to fashion equitable remedies18 0 and involves no intru-
sion into legislative or executive functions.'l8  Nevertheless, judicially
decreed immunity is a new concept and thus will encounter resist-
ance.8 2 Virgin Islands v. Smith,8 3 decided in 1980, is the first case to
formally recognize and utilize defense witness immunity as an inherent
judicial remedy.8 4
A common objection to judicially decreed immunity is that the
decision whether or not to grant immunity "is not a task congenial to
the judicial function."8 5 It is said that a judge cannot maintain impar-
tiality if he is required to decide the merits of an immunity request18 6
and that a court "is in no position to weigh the public interest in the
178. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra.
179. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
180. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969-71 (3d Cir. 1980). See also note 184
infra.
181. Constitutional remedies are within the province of the judiciary; hence, a somewhat
facetious argument might be made that in "coerced" immunity situations, the prosecution
intrudes into the judiciary by using its exclusive statutory power to redress a constitutional
wrong. See note 21 supra.
182. After extensive discussion of judicially decreed immunity and rejection of the idea,
one judge remarked, "I hope I am not confronted with need to decide what should be done
if some other judge accepts [Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980)] as gospel
and announces a grant of judicial immunity. However, I am aware that a judicial act in
excess of jurisdiction may be a nullity and I think that any grant of judicial immunity is in
excess ofjurisdiction." United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. 205, 211 (D. Colo. 1980)
(Winner, C.J., mem.). Compare McMichael with United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). "When any novel legal proposition is urged
upon a court, there is a natural judicial reluctance to say 'never."' Id at 777 (Lumbard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
183. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
184. The court in Virgin Islands v. Smith credited the United States Supreme Court with
the discovery of inherent judicial immunity power. "Although we have characterized the
immunity remedy as new, it is new only in the sense of its application to this type of case.
Both the Supreme Court and this court have previously found an inherent judicial power to
grant witness immunity in order to vindicate constitutional rights." 615 F.2d at 971 (citing
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)). See also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449 (1975); Adams v. Maryland. 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
At least one state judge has tried to "judicially fashion" immunity to override a wit-
ness's self-incrimination privilege by means of an order to testify coupled with a protective
order forbidding use of the testimony in any criminal proceeding. The attempt was held
invalid. Whippany Paper Bd. Co. v. Alfano, 176 N.J. Super. 363, 423 A.2d 648 (1980). See
also State v. Linsky, 117 N.H. 866, 883-84, 379 A.2d 813, 824 (1977).
185. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
1077 (1981).
186. Id at 779 (Lumbard, J., concurring and dissenting). See also United States v. Mc-
Michael, 492 F. Supp. 205 (D. Colo. 1980).
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comparative worth of prosecuting a defendant or his witness."' 87 The
impartiality problem can be solved by having a second judge hear the
immunity request in a collateral in camera proceeding.18  The trial
judge can thereby eliminate all risk ofjeopardizing his objectivity. The
criticism of a judge's ability to weigh competing societal interests fails
to take into account the remedial nature of judicially decreed immu-
nity. "'89 The decree is considered only as a last resort-when no other
action short of acquittal or dismissal will preserve the defendant's due
process rights. The judge is not acting upon a routine request wherein
the only interests to be weighed are the potential inability to prosecute
the witness and the societal benefit of having his testimony. 9 ' The de-
fendant's due process rights are at issue and cannot be compromised in
the balance. Further, if the prosecutor, who is ostensibly in a better
position to weigh the public interests, disagrees with a judge's decision
to grant immunity, he may effectively veto the decision by dropping the
case and thereby preserve his right to prosecute the witness. This puts
the prosecutor in virtually the same position in which he would have
been without court ordered immunity because the due process violation
would have required dismissal or acquittal in any event. In either situ-
ation, the prosecutor forfeits a prosecution, whether by choice or by adismissal. 9
Conclusion
A brief historical and constitutional analysis shows that immunity
is a constitutionally compatible power inherent in all branches of gov-
ernment. Immunity was developed in England, as a practical aid in the
187. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 776. See also In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-
79 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); State v. Buchanan, 110
Ariz. 285, 518 P.2d 108 (1974).
188. See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process. 4 Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 581 n.38 (1978). For a criticism of the potential
costs of insulating such evidence from the prosecution, see United States v. Turkish, 623
F.2d 769, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1980) (Lumbard, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1077 (1981).
189. "We are ... not concerned with a new or unique constitutional right, but rather
with the prescription of a new remedy to protect an established right." Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d at 971.
190. District Judge Troutman, in United States v. Shober, made this observation: "We
must look beyond the limited societal interests . . . weighing against the grant of immu-
nity. . . . [Olur proper concern has broader dimensions, including the accused's right to
due process of law, for the parameters of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause form the
matrix of the Court's power to fashion judicial immunity for a prospective defense witness."
489 F. Supp..412, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
191. From the prosecutor's standpoint, "coerced" immunity and judicially fashioned im-
munity, while achieving the same result, operate exactly backwards from one another. In
the former, the court says, "Immunize or we stop the trial"; in the latter, "Stop the trial or we
immunize."
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prosecution of crime.1 92 It was imported to the United States as an
accepted common law principle, survived early constitutional chal-
lenge,' 93 and has been repeatedly endorsed as a valid substitute for the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 94 Because im-
munity until recently has been administered only in statutory form,
case law analysis has focused on the scope of statutory authority and
protection rather than on the source of immunity power. Also, because
immunity has been used as a prosecutorial aid, its use has been mis-
leadingly labeled the sole province of law enforcement. 195 Analogizing
immunity to the suspension of criminal penalties further bolsters the
misconception. 9 6 The notion thus has developed that immunity is an
exclusively legislative or executive power and that the judiciary has no
immunity power absent statutory authority. 9 7
A more satisfactory analysis must begin by identifying the func-
tion of immunity in our constitutional system, free of historical as-
sumption or analogy. Immunity can only be defined in terms of its
function as a Fifth Amendment privilege substitute. The privilege
against self-incrimination limits all branches of government and may
be supplanted by an equally protective grant of immunity.'98 When an
important function of government, such as the detection and prosecu-
tion of crime, is seriously impaired by a witness' claim of Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, the Constitution thus allows the government the option
of foregoing prosecution of the witness in return for his privileged testi-
mony. '99 The power to grant immunity is not expressly set forth in the
Constitution. Rather, it is an implied power grounded in common law
tradition. Just as there is no express provision for immunity, so there is
no express limitation on its use by any one branch of government.
The Constitution offers no guidance as to which of government's
functions are important enough to justify using the immunity power.
Our federal and state governments, however, have repeatedly an-
nounced through statutes their policy decision that the use of govern-
mental immunity power is justified whenever the public interest is
thereby furthered.2° Statutes presently authorize the use of immunity
for the narrow public interest in prosecuting criminals. Certainly, the
broader public interest in ensuring the fair administration of justice
192. See Kasligar, 406 U.S. at 443-47.
193. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892).
194. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
195. See notes 55-107 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 74-85 and accompanying text supra.
197. See notes 55-85 and accompanying text supra.
198. See generaly Kastigar v. United States, .406 U.S. 441 (1972).
199. Id
200. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
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and in securing a citizen's due process rights is no less compelling.210
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court often has examined
the requirements of a fair trial and has identified an increasing number
of situations in which due process might require immunizing a defense
witness.20 2 Most immunity statutes are grossly inadequate to safeguard
a defendant's due process rights.20 3 Prosecutors have tremendous dis-
cretion to deny defense requests, and courts are usually relegated to a
"rubber stamp" role in approving the prosecutor's decision. In re-
sponse, courts are turning to their own resources. Newly discovered
"coercive" immunity2" is gaining acceptance, and a number of courts
have viewed the "judicially fashioned" immunity of Virgin Islands v.
Smith20 5 with interest.20
6
Change in this area is already evident, and movement toward re-
form in the courts will likely outpace legislative reforms. Nevertheless,
more sensitive administration of existing immunity statutes can effect
improvements more quickly than can either judicial or legislative re-
form. Prosecutors should apply the statutory public interest inquiry
more broadly2 7 and should view their discretionary authority as a fact-
finding tool rather than as a mere prosecutorial aid.20 8 Improved ad-
ministration of immunity statutes can prevent due process violations,
thus reducing the need for legislative or judicial intervention.
Legislators should make statutory immunity reciprocal and should
vest some degree of court discretion in all immunity decisions. 2 9 Trial
court participation in the initial immunity decision will lend more
credence to defense request denials by removing the specter of
prosecutorial bias. Greater credibility will in turn discourage subse-
quent constitutional attacks.
The remedies of coerced and judicially fashioned immunity
should be welcomed. Appropriately safeguarded judicial intervention
201. See State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974).
202. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). See also notes 116-68 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 55-107 and accompanying text supra.
204. See notes 169-72 and accompanying text supra.
205. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
206. See note 168 supra.
207. See State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (1974).
208. "The public prosecutor must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on
the one hand, to furnish that adversary element essential to the informed decision of any
controversy, but being possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are
pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice." Professional
Responsibilily: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958). See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 and DR 7-103(B) (1981).
209. See notes 96-107 and accompanying text supra.
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does not threaten the prosecutor's function.21 ° On the contrary, it pro-
vides a court with an alternative to mandatory dismissal or reversal,
thereby preserving the government's right to prosecute. 1 Moreover,
the possibility of court intervention may act as a deterrent to a prosecu-
tor's unjustified refusal to seek defense witness immunity.
Only combined administrative, legislative and judicial reform can
render the immunity process more responsive to evolving due process
requirements. Administrative and legislative changes are interdepen-
dent to effect meaningful reform at the initial immunity application
stage. Even the most conscientiously drawn and applied statute, how-
ever, will not prevent an occasional due process violation. Only judi-
cial action can furnish immunity as a remedy. Conversely, a court can
act in its remedial capacity only after a due process violation has oc-
curred and is in no position toprevent violations. All branches of gov-
ernment share the goal and the responsibility of ensuring due process
protection in our criminal justice system; only their concerted effort can
accomplish that end.
210. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 971-74 (3d Cir. 1980).
211. See notes 185-91 and accompanying text supra.
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